Score Overview

Overall

Visual

BSA

Seed round

Ready For

📈

Good foundation- Your deck has solid elements. Focus on the top priorities below to level up.

Problem 82

Solution 80

Market 62

Biz Model 71

Traction 66

Competition 42

Team 80

Financials 58

Ask/Funds 80

Design 72

Regulatory 62

IP / Tech 47

~Deck + InterpretationThis is not a score for the startup or deck. It shows the balance between submitted-deck evidence and AI investor interpretation. Interpretive claims can be useful, but verify them before quoting as facts.

84% grounded in the submitted deck

17 interpretive claims worth verifying. Section badges show where the analysis is more interpretive.

executive summary ~competitive positioning ~narrative review ~dimensions ~bsa analysis ~sector insights ~

How to read source labels →

/100

Marlow

Marlow is practice management software for independent physiotherapy practices, combining scheduling, in-session notes and insurer-ready billing in one tool.

SeedHealthtech / Vertical SaaS (practice management software)

Live in 11 practices across 3 countries since March 2026, with 6 named reference practices in NL, PL and DE
Founder-market fit: CEO is a practising physiotherapist who ran a 4-therapist practice; CTO shipped v1 in six months; insurer claims-director advisor
Clear, simple monetisation at €89/practice/month with a defined second revenue line (patient payments) and 80% gross margin assumption

Top Priority

Add a competitive landscape slide naming actual European physio and practice-management vendors (and the bookkeeper/billing-service status quo), with an explicit axis of differentiation - tablet-native notes during treatment plus built-in NL/DE/PL insurer claim formats for 1-4 therapist practices - and evidence (from the 38 interviews) of what each of the 11 live practices used before Marlow.

Now

Competitive Landscape: 42/100

There is no competition slide at all across the 14 slides; the only competitive hint is an oblique reference to "a desktop tool from 2009" on the Why Now slide.

After Fix

Target: 75+ / 100

Add a dedicated competition slide naming the real incumbents by market (e.g. the NL/DE physio practice suites and generic tools like Google Calendar + Excel) with a 2-axis map: small-practice fit vs insurer-claim depth

Critical Red Flags

1No competitive landscape anywhere in 14 slides - established European physio and practice-management vendors are never named, and the central claim that physiotherapists 'mostly do not' have software is asserted rather than evidenced. The roadmap (patient payments, exercise plans, locum marketplace) also collides with PSPs, exercise-prescription apps and staffing platforms with no acknowledgement.

2Zero regulatory or data-protection treatment for software holding patient notes and insurer claims in three countries: no GDPR/health-data processing position, no national e-health certification (e.g. German TI/KBV-style requirements), no clinical record retention or data-loss liability discussion - while Slide 3 presents mandatory digital records by 2027 purely as a tailwind, ignoring that it can trigger certification burdens and invite insurer- or association-sponsored free tools.

3Financial model is unbridged and internally strained: €18m ARR by 2030 at €89 ARPU implies roughly 17,000 practices - a number never stated or defended - while the €4.2bn TAM covers all healthcare practice management software in Europe including dentists and GPs with entrenched incumbents. The 80% gross margin ignores unmetered SMS, hosting, hands-on support for non-technical practices, and the permanent engineering tax of maintaining three divergent insurer claim formats. Traction slide shows six partner names and no metrics at all - no MRR, trial-to-paid conversion, churn, or usage depth.

Action Plan

1
Add competitive landscape slide
Slides 4, 5, 7medium effort
Action
Insert a new competition slide after Slide 4 naming actual European physio and practice-management vendors plus the spreadsheet/bookkeeper status quo, with an explicit axis: tablet-native notes during treatment + built-in NL/DE/PL insurer claim formats for 1-4 therapist practices.
Why it matters
There is no competition slide across 14 slides; the only hint is an oblique 'desktop tool from 2009', which reads as either naivety or avoidance to any healthcare-software investor.
Deliverable
One 2x2 or feature-grid slide with named vendors, plus a line stating what each of the 11 live practices used before Marlow (from the 38 interviews).
Expected impact
Directly lifts the weakest dimension (Competitive Landscape 42/100) and defuses the 'incumbent adds a lightweight tier' objection.
2
Replace top-down TAM with bottom-up
Slides 4, 9medium effort
Action
Swap the €4.2bn all-healthcare TAM for a bottom-up SAM/SOM: count licensed physio, chiro and osteo practices per target country from the public registries you already cite on Slide 10, apply €89/month, and reconcile the practice-count path to €18m ARR by 2030.
Why it matters
€18m at €89 ARPU implies roughly 17,000 practices - a number never stated or defended - while the TAM includes dentists and GPs with entrenched incumbents.
Deliverable
Revised Slide 4 with named source, SAM and SOM figures; a practices-per-year row added beneath the Slide 9 ARR curve.
Expected impact
Raises Market (62) and Financials (58) credibility and pre-empts 'what share of the market is that?'
3
Rebuild traction slide around metrics
Slides 7medium effort
Action
Convert the logo wall into a metrics slide: current MRR, paying vs trial practices, trial-to-paid conversion, logo/revenue retention since March 2026, and usage depth (tablet notes per week, % of invoices issued through Marlow).
Why it matters
At seed the traction slide carries the most weight, and this one shows six names and zero numbers - investors will assume the numbers are unflattering.
Deliverable
Redesigned Slide 7 with a monthly growth line and a small name strip beneath, labelled as practice names rather than logo artwork.
Expected impact
Lifts Traction & Metrics (66) and answers 'how many of the six are paying?' head-on.
4
Insert regulatory and data-protection slide
Slides 3, 6medium effort
Action
Add a slide covering GDPR controller/processor model, hosting location, encryption and backup policy, record retention per country, and a stated position on e-health certification in DE/NL/PL - including whether the 2027 mandate is a gate or a free-tool threat.
Why it matters
Software holding patient notes and insurer claims in three countries currently names no actual regulation anywhere in the deck, while Slide 3 treats the 2027 mandate purely as tailwind.
Deliverable
One compliance slide plus a named-regulation source line added to Slide 3's first tailwind.
Expected impact
Lifts Regulatory & Compliance (62) and removes a diligence blocker for healthcare-focused funds.
5
Add unit economics and margin build
Slides 8, 10, 13medium effort
Action
Add CAC, payback months and observed churn to Slide 8, a demo-to-paid funnel to Slide 10, and a gross margin build itemising SMS, hosting and support so the 80% at scale figure is defensible - then tie the 35% sales allocation to a practice-acquisition target toward 400.
Why it matters
At €89 ARPU with an outbound calling motion, payback is the single thing an investor models first, and unmetered SMS plus hands-on support quietly erode the stated margin.
Deliverable
A three-number economics strip on Slide 8, a funnel line on Slide 10, and a CAC/payback bridge under the Slide 13 ask.
Expected impact
Makes the Financials and Business Model defensible under diligence and justifies the €1.2m allocation.

Top Strengths

Founder-market fit is unusually strong: Anna K. is a practising physiotherapist with eight years in a four-therapist Utrecht practice who ran its admin herself (the origin of the product), paired with a CTO who previously led a payments team at a Polish fintech and a product designer from a consumer app with two million users - plus advisors including a former NL insurer claims director and an exited DE healthcare software founder.
Sharply specified, quantified problem grounded in primary research: 38 practice interviews in 2025 yielding concrete figures (6h/week admin per therapist, 23-day average visit-to-invoice gap) that map directly onto the three product pillars (scheduling, notes, billing) on one screen.
Credible early commercial signal and a disciplined ask: live in 11 practices across NL, PL and DE since March 2026, a simple €89/practice/month price with transparent €19/extra-therapist expansion, and a €1.2m SAFE with €300k already committed from two Dutch healthcare angels, 18 months runway and a specific 6-person hiring plan.

Priority Fixes

1Add a competitive landscape slide naming actual European physio and practice-management vendors (and the bookkeeper/billing-service status quo), with an explicit axis of differentiation - tablet-native notes during treatment plus built-in NL/DE/PL insurer claim formats for 1-4 therapist practices - and evidence (from the 38 interviews) of what each of the 11 live practices used before Marlow.
2Replace the €4.2bn all-healthcare TAM with a bottom-up SAM/SOM: count licensed physio, chiro and osteo practices per target country from the public registries you already cite, apply €89/month, and show the practice count path (and ARPU expansion) that reconciles to €18m ARR by 2030 - then state the ~17,000-practice implication explicitly or revise the forecast.
3Rebuild Slide 7 as a metrics slide: current MRR, trial-to-paid conversion, logo/revenue retention since March 2026, and usage depth per practice (tablet notes per week, % of invoices issued through Marlow vs. spreadsheet) - keep partner names as a secondary band, and clarify that the cards are names, not logo artwork.
4Insert a regulatory and data-protection slide: GDPR controller/processor model, hosting location, encryption and backup/data-loss policy, record retention obligations per country, and a stated position on e-health certification requirements in DE/NL/PL - including whether the 2027 mandate creates a certification gate or an insurer/association-funded free-tool threat.
5Add unit economics to the GTM and ask: CAC and payback from the demos already run, sales cycle length and close rate, and a gross margin build that itemises SMS, hosting and support so the 80% figure is defensible - then tie the 35% sales allocation to a concrete practice-acquisition target on the path to 400 practices.

Investor Readiness

Seed round

Not ready yet

Pre-seed

Seed

Series A

Series B+

Blockers

1No competitive landscape slide - incumbents in physio practice software (e.g. established EU vendors) are not addressed and no moat is articulated
2Traction slide shows only customer logos, not metrics: no MRR/ARR, retention, churn, conversion from trial, or growth trend
3Unit economics missing - no CAC, payback, LTV or sales-cycle data to support the direct-sales GTM and €18m ARR path

Improvements for Next Level

→Replace the logo wall with hard numbers: paying practices, MRR, MoM growth, trial-to-paid conversion and logo retention since March 2026
→Add a competitive map versus existing physio/practice software vendors with explicit differentiation and defensibility (insurer formats, switching costs, data)
→Ground the financial model bottom-up: practices acquired per rep per month, CAC and payback, ARPU expansion, and the assumptions behind 40% YoY growth and break-even timing
→Quantify the €4.2bn TAM bottom-up (number of EU physio practices x €89/mo) and define SAM/SOM for the NL/PL beachhead

Fundraising Readiness Roadmap

Almost Ready for Seed round

milestones

critical

high priority

Est. time to ready

~1-2 months

Address Investor Blocker[critical]

No competitive landscape slide - incumbents in physio practice software (e.g. established EU vendors) are not addressed and no moat is articulated

Source: Investor Readiness

Address Investor Blocker[critical]

Traction slide shows only customer logos, not metrics: no MRR/ARR, retention, churn, conversion from trial, or growth trend

Source: Investor Readiness

Address Investor Blocker[critical]

Unit economics missing - no CAC, payback, LTV or sales-cycle data to support the direct-sales GTM and €18m ARR path

Source: Investor Readiness

Strengthen Traction Evidence[high]

Replace the logo wall on Slide 7 with a metrics panel: **practices live by month, paying vs trial, MRR today, trial-to-paid conversion rate, logo retention**

Source: Traction & Metrics

Map Competitive Landscape & Moats[medium]

Source: Competitive Landscape

Build Realistic Financial Model[high]

Rebuild Slide 9 bottom-up: practices live x €89/month x (1 + add-on therapists), and show the implied practice count each year (e.g. ~17,000 practices at €18m ARR) so reviewers can sanity-check against the €4.2bn TAM

Source: Financial Projections

What Would Change an Investor's Mind

→Replace the logo wall with hard numbers: paying practices, MRR, MoM growth, trial-to-paid conversion and logo retention since March 2026

→Add a competitive map versus existing physio/practice software vendors with explicit differentiation and defensibility (insurer formats, switching costs, data)

→Ground the financial model bottom-up: practices acquired per rep per month, CAC and payback, ARPU expansion, and the assumptions behind 40% YoY growth and break-even timing

→Quantify the €4.2bn TAM bottom-up (number of EU physio practices x €89/mo) and define SAM/SOM for the NL/PL beachhead

Radar Analysis

CONTENT / NARRATIVE - SCORE 71 (Grade B)

Internal reference profile overlay

Marlow

High-signal profile

Lean accelerator profile

Scale narrative profile

Technical moat profile

VISUAL ANALYSIS - SCORE 81 (Grade A-)

Internal reference profile overlay

Marlow

High-signal profile

Lean accelerator profile

Scale narrative profile

Technical moat profile

Content & Narrative

10-dimension analysis

Problem Statement

The problem is specific, quantified and interview-validated - 6h/week of admin per therapist and a 23-day visit-to-invoice gap from 38 practice interviews - with a supporting owner quote later in the deck.

Evidence

Slide 2: 6h/week of admin per therapist in a two-person practice, sourced to own interviews, 38 practices, 2025
Slide 2: 23 days average gap between a visit and the invoice for it - a quantified, specific pain metric
Slide 2: Clear persona and before-state - practices run on paper, a calendar app and a spreadsheet, notes not searchable across visits
Slide 6: Direct customer quote - "I used to spend Sunday evening on invoices. Now they go out when the patient leaves." (practice owner, Utrecht)

Issues

Slide 2: Pain is quantified in hours and days but never in euros - no estimate of cash-flow cost or lost billable time value
Slide 2: Interview data is self-reported with no detail on how many of the 38 said they would pay to fix it
Slide 2: Text layout buries the metrics mid-paragraph, so the 6h/week and 23 days figures lose visual impact

Suggestions

Convert the pain to money: e.g. "6h/week x €60/h billable = ~€15k/year of lost capacity per therapist" directly on Slide 2
Move the Utrecht owner quote from Slide 6 onto the problem slide and add a second quote from a Polish or German practice
Add a line from the 38 interviews on willingness to pay, e.g. "29 of 38 said they would pay up to €100/month to remove the evening note-writing"

Solution & Value Proposition

A sharp one-line value prop - "One screen for the whole visit: book, treat, note, bill" - backed by a concrete UI mockup and 11 live practices, though the 10x improvement is asserted rather than measured.

Evidence

Slide 5: UVP in one sentence - "One screen for the whole visit: book, treat, note, bill", each element mapped to a Slide 2 pain
Slide 5: Product UI mockup with real workflow states (Billed, Notes open, Booked online, Confirmed) rather than a generic hero image
Slide 5: Live in 11 practices since March 2026 - product working with real users, not a concept
Slide 6: Non-obvious insight - insurer and claim formats for NL, DE and PL built in from day one, plus setup in an afternoon, no training day

Issues

Slide 5: No after-state metric - the deck never says the 23-day invoice gap fell to X days for the 11 live practices
Slide 6: The strongest proof point ("therapists tell us this alone gives them their evenings back") is anecdotal, not measured hours saved
Slide 6: No screenshot of the tablet note-taking experience, which is claimed as the single biggest benefit

Suggestions

Add a before/after bar on Slide 5: "23 days to invoice -> 1 day across 11 live practices" to turn the value prop into a measured 10x claim
Show a second screenshot of the in-session tablet note template, since that is the claimed killer feature
State the time saved explicitly, e.g. "average 4.5h/week returned per therapist, measured across 11 practices"

Market Opportunity

A single €4.2bn top-down TAM from an unnamed "industry report" with no SAM or SOM, partially rescued by a genuinely strong three-part Why Now argument.

Evidence

Slide 3: Specific, dated catalyst - insurers and national health systems moving physiotherapy claims to digital formats by 2027, forcing paper practices to switch
Slide 3: Credible structural tailwind - most European physiotherapy is still delivered by practices of one to four therapists, an underserved long tail
Slide 4: Clear beachhead logic - physiotherapists, chiropractors and osteopaths outnumber dentists in every market examined yet lack practice software
Slide 10: Implicit beachhead definition - Netherlands and Poland first (founder networks), Germany in 2027

Issues

Slide 4: TAM sourced to an unnamed "industry report, 2025" with no publisher, scope or methodology shown
Slide 4: TAM is for all healthcare practices in Europe, not physiotherapy - the serviceable segment is never carved out
Slide 4: No SAM or SOM anywhere in the deck, despite Slide 13's 400-practice goal making a bottom-up build easy
Slide 4: The claim that physios outnumber dentists is asserted with no practice counts per market

Suggestions

Replace the top-down figure with a bottom-up build: "~X0,000 physio practices in NL/PL/DE x €89-150/month = €Ym SAM", then extend to Europe
Add a SOM line tied to the plan: "400 practices by 2027 = €0.4m ARR, <0.5% of SAM" to show the target is conservative
Name the TAM source and date, and show the physiotherapy-only sub-segment separately from dentists and GPs

Business Model

Pricing is concrete and well-structured (€89/practice/month up to 4 therapists, €19 per extra therapist, annual at two months free) with an 80% gross margin assumption, but there are no CAC, LTV or payback figures anywhere.

Evidence

Slide 8: Explicit pricing - €89/practice/month up to 4 therapists, €19 per additional therapist, annual plans at two months free
Slide 8: Second revenue line identified with timing - patient invoice payment processing planned for 2027
Slide 8: Deliberate packaging choice - online booking and SMS reminders included, no per-message fees, removing a common billing friction
Slide 9: 80% gross margin at scale stated, comfortably above the SaaS threshold

Issues

Slide 8: No CAC, LTV, payback period or churn stated anywhere in the deck
Slide 10: Outbound calling plus live demo setup implies meaningful sales cost against a €89/month ARPU - the payback math is never addressed
Slide 8: Pricing is stated but not justified - no reference to what practices pay today for calendar apps, bookkeeping or paper processes
Slide 9: The 80% gross margin is an assumption at scale, not a current measured figure from the 11 live practices

Suggestions

Add a unit economics box: "CAC €X from outbound, €1,068 ARR per practice, payback N months, LTV/CAC N:1" using data from the 11 live practices
Justify €89 by anchoring to the alternative: "replaces a €40 calendar app plus 6h/week of admin worth €1,200/month"
State early churn/retention from the March 2026 cohort, even if the sample is small, and show expansion revenue from the €19 per-therapist upsell

Traction & Metrics

11 live practices since March 2026 and 6 named partner practices across 3 countries are real signals, but there is no revenue figure, no growth rate and no retention data - and Slide 7 presents logos as traction without metrics.

Evidence

Slide 5: Live in 11 practices since March 2026 - real deployed users, not a waitlist
Slide 7: 6 named partner practices across 3 countries (FysioPlus Utrecht, Rehab Centrum Warsaw, PhysioWerk Cologne, Motion Clinic Amsterdam, Kinetik Krakow, Praxis am Park Munich), used with permission
Slide 10: Organic PMF signal - four of the practices came from a referral by another practice
Slide 6: Qualitative retention signal - Utrecht owner reports invoices now go out when the patient leaves

Issues

Slide 7: The traction slide shows only names and cities - zero metrics, no MRR, no usage, no retention
Slide 5: No disclosure of how many of the 11 practices are paying versus still in the 30-day trial
Slide 7: No month-on-month growth trend - 11 practices in roughly 2-3 months is stated as a point, not a curve
Slide 9: €0.1m for 2026 is a projection, not booked ARR, so no actual revenue figure appears anywhere in the deck

Suggestions

Replace the logo wall on Slide 7 with a metrics panel: practices live by month, paying vs trial, MRR today, trial-to-paid conversion rate, logo retention
State current booked MRR explicitly (e.g. "€780 MRR from 9 paying practices, up from 2 in March") - small real numbers beat none
Add one engagement metric that proves the product is used, such as "% of visits with notes completed in-session" or "average days from visit to invoice, now X"
Note the referral ratio as a formal metric: "4 of 11 practices (36%) acquired by referral, CAC €0"

Competitive Landscape

There is no competition slide at all across the 14 slides; the only competitive hint is an oblique reference to "a desktop tool from 2009" on the Why Now slide.

Evidence

Slide 3: Acknowledges the status quo alternative - therapists "will not accept a desktop tool from 2009" - implying legacy incumbents exist
Slide 6: "Built for a practice of two, not a hospital" is a clear segment-level differentiation axis vs enterprise/hospital systems
Slide 6: Insurer and claim formats for the Netherlands, Germany and Poland "built in" is a latent regulatory/integration moat
Slide 4: Frames physiotherapy as "the largest unserved segment" vs dentists and GPs who "have had practice software for twenty years"

Issues

Slide 4 (or missing slide): No competitive landscape slide anywhere in the 14-slide deck - no named competitors in NL, DE or PL
Slide 2: The stated incumbent is "paper, a calendar app and a spreadsheet" - implies the deck treats non-consumption as the only competitor, close to a 'no competition' claim
Slide 8: €89/practice/month pricing is presented with no competitive price benchmark, so it is impossible to judge positioning
Slide 12: Roadmap (payments, exercise plans, locum marketplace) is not framed against what competitors already ship
Slide 11: Advisors include a former insurer claims director (NL), but no moat argument is built from that access

Suggestions

Add a dedicated competition slide naming the real incumbents by market (e.g. the NL/DE physio practice suites and generic tools like Google Calendar + Excel) with a 2-axis map: small-practice fit vs insurer-claim depth
Quantify the switching-cost and data moat: state how many insurer claim formats are certified and how long a new entrant would need to replicate NL+DE+PL coverage
Add a price/feature comparison row under Slide 8 showing €89/practice/month vs named alternatives' per-seat pricing
State win/loss evidence from the 11 live practices: what were they using before Marlow, and what did Marlow displace

Team & Founders

A credible, complementary three-founder team: Anna K. (CEO) is a practising physiotherapist with eight years in a four-therapist Utrecht practice, Tomasz W. (CTO) is an engineer who led a payments team at a Polish fintech, and Jonas M. (Product) is a consumer product designer.

Evidence

Slide 11: CEO Anna K. is a physiotherapist with eight years in a four-therapist Utrecht practice and ran the practice admin herself - direct domain expertise and founder-market fit
Slide 11: CTO Tomasz W. is a software engineer who previously led a payments team at a Polish fintech and built the first version of Marlow in six months
Slide 11: Jonas M. (Product) is a product designer formerly at a consumer app with two million users, owning onboarding and the tablet experience
Slide 11: Advisors include a former insurer claims director (NL) and a healthcare software founder (DE) who exited in 2022
Slide 10: Expansion order into the Netherlands and Poland is explicitly justified by founder networks

Issues

Slide 11: Founders are identified only by first name and initial (Anna K., Tomasz W., Jonas M.) with no company names or LinkedIn references - hard to diligence
Slide 11: Portraits are abstract teal gradient placeholders rather than real photos, which reads as unfinished for a seed deck
Slide 11: No founder has a prior startup exit; the only exit cited belongs to an advisor
Slide 13: Six hires planned (three engineering, two sales, one support) but no named key hires or leadership gaps acknowledged
Slide 6: Insurer-ready claims across NL/DE/PL implies regulatory and health-data compliance work, yet no compliance or regulatory lead is identified on the team slide

Suggestions

Add full names, prior employers and years of experience for each founder, plus LinkedIn links - anonymised bios undermine credibility at seed
Replace gradient placeholder avatars with real headshots and add the advisors' names and former institutions
Name the planned first key hire (e.g. a regulatory/compliance or insurer-integrations lead) and tie it to the Slide 13 hiring plan
Add one line of founder execution proof: e.g. the 11 live practices were signed by Anna K. directly in X weeks

Financial Projections

A five-year ARR curve to €18m by 2030 with only two stated assumptions (40% YoY growth from 2027, 80% gross margin at scale) - and the curve visibly contradicts the stated growth rate.

Evidence

Slide 9: Five-year ARR projection presented by year (2026 €0.1m, 2027 €0.9m, 2028 €3.4m, 2029 €9m, 2030 €18m)
Slide 9: Two assumptions are at least stated - 40% YoY growth from 2027 and 80% gross margin at scale
Slide 9: A break-even point is explicitly marked in Year 3
Slide 8: Clear, simple revenue model (€89/practice/month, €19 per additional therapist) that could anchor a bottom-up model
Slide 8: A second revenue line (patient payment processing) is flagged for 2027

Issues

Slide 9: The stated "40% year-on-year growth" is inconsistent with the plotted curve, which implies 100-278% annual growth from 2027-2030
Slide 9: No bottom-up build - practice count, ARPU, CAC, churn and payback are all absent despite the simple per-practice pricing on Slide 8
Slide 9: Chart has no y-axis labels and no cost, burn or headcount lines; break-even in Year 3 is asserted without a cost base
Slide 13: €1.2m for 18 months implies roughly €67k/month burn, but this is never reconciled with the Slide 9 revenue plan
Slide 8: Payments revenue planned for 2027 is not shown as a separate line in the 2027-2030 projection

Suggestions

Rebuild Slide 9 bottom-up: practices live x €89/month x (1 + add-on therapists), and show the implied practice count each year (e.g. ~17,000 practices at €18m ARR) so reviewers can sanity-check against the €4.2bn TAM
Fix the growth-rate contradiction - either restate the actual implied CAGR or correct the curve
Add CAC, gross churn and payback period from the 11 live practices, plus a cost/burn line so break-even in Year 3 is demonstrable
Show a base and downside scenario, and split subscription vs payments revenue from 2027

Ask & Use of Funds

A clean, specific ask: €1.2m seed on a SAFE, €300k already committed from two Dutch healthcare angels, 18 months of runway, a percentage allocation and a named milestone of 400 practices.

Evidence

Slide 13: Specific ask of €1.2m seed on a SAFE, open to a lead
Slide 13: €300k already committed from two Dutch healthcare angels - early validation and momentum
Slide 13: Clear allocation - Product & engineering 45%, Sales & marketing 35%, Operations & support 20%
Slide 13: 18 months of runway with a concrete hiring plan of three engineering, two sales, one support
Slide 13: Milestone-linked headline ("to reach 400 practices") and a next-round trigger (Series A in 2028 once Germany is live)

Issues

Slide 13: The 400-practice milestone is not dated or reconciled with the 18-month runway, nor with the €0.9m 2027 ARR on Slide 9 (400 practices at €89/month is roughly €0.43m ARR)
Slide 13: Allocation percentages are given without justification - no cost per hire, no CAC-based sales budget rationale
Slide 13: Series A timing in 2028 sits beyond the stated 18-month runway from a Spring 2026 raise, leaving a possible gap
Slide 13: No prior raise history or capital efficiency data (how the 11 live practices on Slide 5 were reached and on what capital)
Slide 12: Roadmap items (payments, locum marketplace) extend to 2028 but are not mapped to the funded 18-month period

Suggestions

Add interim milestones with dates: e.g. 'Month 6: 120 practices; Month 12: 250; Month 18: 400 practices and €0.45m ARR, Germany claim formats live'
Justify the 35% sales allocation with a CAC figure from the existing 11 practices and the implied number of new practices it buys
Reconcile the 400-practice target with the Slide 9 2027 ARR figure, or explain the ARPU uplift (additional therapists, payments) that closes the gap
State prior capital raised to date and burn so far to demonstrate capital efficiency

Storytelling & Design

A tight 14-slide arc (problem to why now to market to solution to traction to model to ask) with a clean teal visual language, let down by placeholder assets and a weak traction slide.

Evidence

Slide 2: Pain is quantified and sourced - 6h/week admin per therapist and a 23-day visit-to-invoice gap from interviews with 38 practices in 2025
Slide 5: Realistic product UI mockup with colour-coded status chips (Billed, Notes open, Booked online, Confirmed) makes the solution immediately legible
Slide 6: Customer quote from a practice owner in Utrecht anchors the benefit emotionally
Slide 14: Strong closing line "Every practice, out of the paper age" with a direct contact email
Slide 1-14: Consistent footer pagination and teal visual language across a disciplined 14-slide length

Issues

Slide 7: Claims "logos used with permission" but partners are rendered as plain text cards - no actual logo artwork, undermining the "Trusted by leading practices" header
Slide 7: Traction slide shows only partner names and cities - no revenue, retention or usage numbers, so the strongest narrative beat is the weakest slide
Slide 11: Founder portraits are abstract gradient circles instead of real photos
Slide 9: The ARR chart has no y-axis labels, making the curve hard to read as data
Slide 2: Text layout appears interleaved/jumbled (the 6h/week stat is spliced mid-sentence), suggesting broken column flow

Suggestions

Replace Slide 7 text cards with real partner logos, and add hard traction metrics: MRR, practices live (11 since March 2026), retention and therapist seats
Add real founder headshots on Slide 11 and full names to match the professionalism of the rest of the deck
Label the y-axis on Slide 9 and overlay practice count so the chart reads as a model, not a shape
Fix the column flow on Slide 2 so the 6h/week and 23-day statistics sit as standalone stat blocks rather than splicing the body copy

Regulatory & Compliance

The deck shows implicit regulatory awareness - insurer claim formats for NL/DE/PL and a mandatory digital records driver by 2027 - but names no actual regulation (GDPR, EU MDR, NIS2, national e-health standards) and provides no compliance plan, owner, or timeline for a vertical handling patient health data across three jurisdictions.

Evidence

Slide 3: 'Insurers and national health systems across Europe are moving physiotherapy claims and records to digital formats by 2027' - regulatory shift framed as the core Why Now driver
Slide 6: 'Insurer-ready from day one - invoice and claim formats for the Netherlands, Germany and Poland are built in' indicates concrete payer-format compliance work already done
Slide 11: Advisor is a former insurer claims director (NL), giving some reimbursement-regime expertise at the advisory level
Slide 10: go-to-market references public registries listing every licensed practice, showing awareness of professional licensing structures

Issues

Slide 6: Product stores patient treatment notes across NL, PL and DE with no mention of GDPR, data residency, encryption or PHI handling - a major omission for a health-data product
Slide 12: Roadmap lists Germany claim formats and localisation for 2027 but contains no compliance, certification or data-protection milestones
Slide 11: No compliance officer, DPO or regulatory counsel named on the team or advisory bench
Slide 13: €1.2m use of funds (45% product, 35% sales, 20% ops) allocates no budget line to regulatory or certification work despite a three-country footprint
Slide 5: Online patient booking and SMS reminders involve patient-identifiable data with no stated consent or data-processing approach

Suggestions

Add a compliance slide naming the specific regimes: GDPR Art. 9 (special category health data), Dutch NEN 7510/7512, German gematik/TI requirements and Polish health data rules, with the status of each
State explicitly whether Marlow is classified as a medical device under EU MDR or falls outside it as administrative software, and cite the reasoning
Name a DPO or data-protection advisor and state where patient data is hosted (EU region, sub-processors, encryption at rest and in transit)
Add compliance milestones to the Slide 12 roadmap - e.g. 'ISO 27001 / NEN 7510 certification by Q4 2027' - with an owner and cost estimate in the Slide 13 budget
Replace the vague 'mandatory by 2027' claim on Slide 3 with the named directive or national programme driving it

IP & Technical Defensibility

Marlow presents no patents, no proprietary dataset and no hard-tech claim - the moat rests on vertical focus, ease of setup and pre-built insurer claim formats, which are workflow advantages rather than defensible technology.

Evidence

Slide 6: Insurer claim formats for NL, Germany and Poland built in - multi-country payer integration work that is genuinely time-consuming to replicate
Slide 11: CTO Tomasz W. built the first version of Marlow in six months and previously led a payments team at a Polish fintech, indicating real execution capability
Slide 5: Clear, specific product description (one calendar, tablet notes with treatment templates, billing generated from notes) rather than vague 'proprietary platform' language

Issues

Slide 1-14: No patents, filings or IP strategy mentioned anywhere in the deck
Slide 12: Outcome tracking across visits is a 2028 roadmap item - the one potential proprietary dataset does not yet exist
Slide 4-5: No competition slide; the deck never explains why an incumbent dental/GP practice-software vendor could not add a physio module
Slide 6: Core differentiators - setup in an afternoon, tablet notes, templates - are product polish, not technical barriers, and are replicable by a funded competitor
Slide 8: €89/practice/month subscription with no stated switching-cost or data lock-in argument to defend against price competition

Suggestions

Quantify the claim-format moat: state how many insurer formats are implemented per country and the engineering months each required, framing it as a compounding integration barrier
Add a competition slide naming the actual incumbents (e.g. legacy desktop physio tools, generic practice-management suites) with a positioning matrix on vertical depth vs. ease of setup
Articulate the data flywheel: once patient history, notes and claims live in Marlow, switching means re-keying years of records - state measured churn or retention from the 11 live practices to prove it
Pull outcome tracking forward and position the anonymised treatment-outcome dataset as a future proprietary asset with a stated data-rights clause in customer contracts
If any element (e.g. notes-to-claim auto-generation) is novel, note whether a filing has been considered; otherwise state explicitly that the moat is distribution and integration depth, not IP

Visual & Design

7-dimension visual pass

Visual Hierarchy

A disciplined system of small teal eyebrow labels (PROBLEM, MARKET, THE ASK) above large navy headlines guides the eye consistently, and oversized teal stat numbers like €4.2bn and 6 h / week act as strong focal anchors.

Evidence

Slide 4 uses a huge teal €4.2bn as the dominant element with supporting TAM caption beneath - unmistakable focal point
Slide 2 pairs a left bullet column with two right-hand grey stat cards (6 h/week, 23 days), creating a clear primary/secondary split
Slide 9 places the €18m and Year 3 stat cards at equal weight to the chart, reinforcing the headline claim

Issues

Slide 5's product screenshot competes with the bullet list; neither is clearly dominant and the mockup is cropped at the right edge
Slide 7 headline 'Trusted by leading practices' is louder than the actual evidence - the six name cards are visually flat and uniform
Slide 13 allocation bars are small and sit low-contrast against the right-hand Round card, which pulls attention first

Suggestions

On slide 5, enlarge the UI mockup to ~60% width and reduce bullets to three short bold keywords (Schedule / Note / Bill) with one line each
On slide 7, add a headline metric such as '11 practices live · 6 named partners' in large teal type above the logo grid
Give slide 13's budget bars more height (12-16px) and label each with the euro amount, not just percentage

Readability

Clean sans-serif typography in navy on white with generous line spacing reads well, but several body blocks - especially the three-column cards and the table mockup - drop to ~11px equivalent that would be unreadable from 3 meters.

Evidence

Headlines are set large and bold in near-black navy, high contrast against white - legible at distance on slides 2, 3, 5, 10, 12
Slide 1 and 14 use oversized white type on dark teal/navy backgrounds with excellent contrast
Stat cards use large teal numerals with grey supporting captions at clear size differential

Issues

Slide 5's schedule table text (patient names, treatments, status chips) is tiny and would be illegible when projected
Footnotes on slides 4, 8, 9, 13 are set in very light grey at small size - low contrast, effectively invisible
Three-column card text on slides 3, 6, 10 runs 5-6 lines of small grey copy per card

Suggestions

Increase the footer footnote grey from light (#9aa) to a mid grey (#5a6b70) and bump one point size
Trim each card on slides 3/6/10 to a bold claim plus max 2 lines of supporting text
Zoom the slide 5 mockup to show only 3 rows at larger scale rather than 5 cramped rows

Layout

A consistent left-aligned grid with a shared top eyebrow and bottom footer holds the deck together, with generous whitespace and well-balanced two-column and three-card arrangements.

Evidence

Uniform margins and a 'Marlow · Seed' left / page number right footer on every content slide (2-13)
Three-card grids on slides 3, 6, 10, 12 are evenly gutter-spaced with equal card heights
Slide 2 and 4 use a comfortable 50/50 split with the right-hand grey rounded cards aligned to the headline baseline

Issues

Large empty bottom zones on slides 3, 4, 8, 10, 13 make slides feel top-heavy rather than deliberately airy
Slide 5's browser-chrome mockup bleeds past the right margin, breaking the otherwise strict grid
Slide 4's left column ends abruptly, leaving an awkward vertical imbalance against the taller right card

Suggestions

Vertically center content blocks on sparse slides (4, 8, 13) or add a supporting footnote band to close the bottom gap
Fully contain the slide 5 mockup inside the right margin with a soft drop shadow
Add a single proof line under slide 4's TAM (e.g. 'SAM: 120k practices in NL/DE/PL') to balance the column

Consistency

Exceptionally consistent system: one typeface family, a strict palette of deep teal (#0d6b5e), navy (#131a2e), light grey cards (#f5f7f8) and white, applied identically across all 14 slides.

Evidence

Teal is used only for accents, stats and section labels; navy only for headlines - no palette drift anywhere
Rounded-corner grey cards reused identically on slides 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13
Bookend slides 1 and 14 share the same 'marlow' dot wordmark lockup

Issues

Slide 12's roadmap cards add a teal top rule not used on any other card family, and slide 8's price card uses a teal outline instead of grey fill
Slide 6's pull-quote uses italic type not seen elsewhere in the deck
Team avatars on slide 11 are gradient placeholder circles, inconsistent with the otherwise finished look

Suggestions

Standardise one card style (grey fill) and use the teal top rule only where it signals a meaningful category
Replace the gradient avatar blobs with real headshots cropped to the same circle size
Keep the italic treatment but reuse it for at least one more customer quote so it reads as a system element

Data Visualization

Only one real chart exists - the teal ARR curve on slide 9 - and while it is clean and point-labelled, most metrics elsewhere are presented as big numbers in cards rather than visualized comparisons.

Evidence

Slide 9's line chart labels each year's value (€0.1m, €0.9m, €3.4m, €9m, €18m) directly on the curve with no legend needed
Slide 13 uses horizontal teal progress bars for use of funds (45/35/20%), an effective simple visual
Slide 5 includes a realistic product table with colour-coded status chips (Billed green, Notes open amber, Booked online blue, Confirmed)

Issues

No y-axis labels or gridlines on slide 9 - the curve's steepness is unverifiable and reads as a generic hockey stick
Traction (slide 7) has zero charted data: no MRR, retention or practice growth curve, only a logo grid
Market slide 4 shows a single number with no TAM/SAM/SOM visualization or growth trend

Suggestions

Add a labelled y-axis (€m) and mark actuals vs. forecast with a solid-to-dashed line break at 2026 on slide 9
Replace or supplement slide 7 with a monthly-practices-live bar chart since March 2026 plus MRR and churn figures
Turn slide 4 into nested TAM/SAM/SOM blocks showing the physiotherapy sub-segment as a quantified slice of €4.2bn

Credibility Signals

The deck signals credibility through named partner practices across six cities and three countries and explicit sourcing, but weakens it with text-only 'logos', placeholder avatars and an unnamed industry report.

Evidence

Slide 7 names FysioPlus (Utrecht), Rehab Centrum (Warsaw), PhysioWerk (Cologne), Motion Clinic (Amsterdam), Kinetik (Krakow), Praxis am Park (Munich) with 'logos used with permission'
Slide 2 cites primary research: 'our interviews, 38 practices, 2025'
Slide 11 lists advisors - a former insurer claims director (NL) and a healthcare software founder (DE, exited 2022)

Issues

The 'logo' cards are set type, not actual logos - undermining the 'logos used with permission' caption
Founder photos are abstract teal gradient circles; no faces, no LinkedIn-level credibility
Slide 4 sources TAM to an unnamed 'industry report, 2025' with no publisher cited

Suggestions

Swap in real partner logo artwork on slide 7, or relabel the slide as 'Live practices' to match the evidence shown
Add professional headshots plus prior-employer logos (Polish fintech, consumer scheduling app) on slide 11
Name the market report publisher and year directly in the slide 4 source line

Narrative Flow

A textbook investor sequence - hook → problem → why now → market → solution → product → traction → model → financials → GTM → team → roadmap → ask → closing line - reinforced by visible section eyebrows that act as chapter markers.

Evidence

Slide 3 'Why now' sits between problem and market, pre-empting the timing objection with the 2027 digital-records mandate
Slide 14 closes with a bold statement, contact email and city - a clean CTA bookend to the slide 1 title
Page counters (2/14 … 14/14) give the reader a clear sense of progression

Issues

Traction (slide 7) arrives after solution but shows only partner names - the '11 practices live since March 2026' proof is buried as a grey line on slide 5
No competition slide anywhere in the arc, a visible gap for a category with incumbent practice-management tools
The closing CTA offers an email but no explicit next step (e.g. 'book a 30-minute data room walkthrough')

Suggestions

Promote the '11 practices live' metric to a large stat card at the top of slide 7
Insert a competitive positioning slide between slides 7 and 8 using the existing three-card grid style
Add a one-line ask-and-action under the slide 14 email, e.g. 'Lead the €1.2m SAFE - data room available on request'

Missing Content

i8 items

1Competitive landscape and differentiation vs. named EU physio/practice-management incumbents and status-quo alternatives (bookkeepers, external billing services, generic calendar apps)

2Regulatory, GDPR and health-data compliance (data processing roles, record retention by country, e-health certification path for DE/NL/PL)

3Unit economics and GTM metrics: CAC, payback period, sales cycle length, demo-to-close rate, LTV, and gross margin build including SMS/hosting/support COGS

4Detailed traction metrics: MRR/ARR to date, trial-to-paid conversion, logo and revenue retention, usage depth (notes written on tablet, invoices actually issued through Marlow)

5Bottom-up market sizing: number of physio/chiro/osteo practices by country, SAM/SOM at €89 ARPU, and the practice count underpinning €18m ARR

6Customer switching and onboarding: migration of years of patient history, insurer audit trails, incumbent contract exits, and multi-therapist adoption/churn risk

7Pricing evidence: current software spend per practice and willingness-to-pay validation from the 38 interviews

8Technical and commercial defensibility: insurer-format moat, data advantage, platform/supplier dependencies (SMS gateways, calendar APIs, future PSPs)

BSA Score

/100

KYB

KYC

KYE

🏢

Know Your Business

KYBi

Evidence

Slide 8: Pricing is concrete and legible - €89/practice/month for up to 4 therapists, €19 per additional therapist, 30-day trial, annual plans at two months free, showing the founder has made real packaging decisions rather than hand-waving.
Slide 8 & 12: A second revenue line (patient payment processing in 2027) is identified and sequenced into the roadmap, suggesting awareness that a €89 ARPU SaaS needs expansion revenue to be venture-scale.
Slide 11: Founder-market fit is operational, not theoretical - the CEO is a practising physiotherapist who ran the admin of a four-therapist practice in Utrecht, and the CTO shipped v1 in six months.
Slide 13: Use of funds is broken down (45% product, 35% sales, 20% ops), with €300k committed, 18 months runway, and a named milestone of 400 practices.

Blind Spots

Slide 7: The traction slide shows six logos and zero metrics - no MRR, trial-to-paid conversion, churn, or expansion revenue - which for a company live in 11 practices is a conspicuous omission rather than an accident.
Slide 9: The €18m ARR by 2030 path assumes 40% YoY growth and 80% gross margin with no bridge from €89/month to practice count - at €89 ARPU, €18m implies roughly 17,000 practices, a number never stated or defended.
Slide 10 & 13: A direct outbound sales motion with 20-minute demos is proposed with no CAC, payback period, sales cycle length, or close rate - yet 35% of the raise is allocated to it.
Slide 8: SMS reminders included with no per-message fees sits awkwardly against an 80% gross margin assumption; SMS, hosting, and support for non-technical practices are real COGS that are never quantified.

👥

Know Your Customer

KYCi

Evidence

Slide 2: The pain is quantified from primary research - 6h/week of admin per therapist and a 23-day average gap between visit and invoice, sourced from 38 practice interviews in 2025, which is far above seed-stage norms.
Slide 6: The customer quote ("I used to spend Sunday evening on invoices", practice owner, Utrecht) captures the emotional trigger - evenings lost - rather than a generic efficiency claim.
Slide 6: Product decisions map directly to customer constraints: setup in an afternoon, spreadsheet patient import, no implementation project, no training day - evidence of knowing that a two-person practice has no IT capacity.
Slide 10: Four of the current practices came from another practice, showing the founder has observed a real peer-referral behaviour among therapists rather than assuming virality.

Blind Spots

Slide 2 & 8: The 38 interviews establish pain but never willingness to pay - there is no evidence of what practices currently spend on software, or why €89/month rather than €49 or €149.
Slide 2: The patient - who books online, receives SMS reminders, and will eventually pay through the invoice in 2027 - is never characterised at all, despite being central to the second revenue line.
Slide 6: Switching cost is invisible: nothing addresses what happens to a practice with years of existing patient history, insurer audit trails, or an incumbent contract - only a spreadsheet import is mentioned.
Slide 5: Live in 11 practices since March 2026 is presented without usage depth - how many therapists write notes on the tablet daily, how many invoices actually flow through Marlow versus the old spreadsheet.

🌍

Know Your Environment

KYEi

Evidence

Slide 3: The why now argument is specific and checkable - insurers and national health systems moving physiotherapy claims to digital formats by 2027, plus a generational shift away from desktop tools from 2009.
Slide 3: Correctly identifies the structural market shape - most European physiotherapy is delivered by practices of one to four therapists, a long tail that is independent and underserved.
Slide 11: Advisory bench shows environmental awareness: a former insurer claims director (NL) and a healthcare software founder (DE, exited 2022) map to the two hardest external dependencies.
Slide 10: Expansion sequencing is grounded in founder networks (NL and PL first) with Germany in 2027, rather than a generic 'Europe' claim.

Blind Spots

Slide 4: There is no competitive landscape slide anywhere in 14 slides - established EU physio and practice-management vendors are never named, and the claim that physiotherapists 'mostly do not' have software is asserted, not evidenced.
Slide 4: The €4.2bn TAM is practice management software for all healthcare practices in Europe - a market that explicitly includes dentists and GPs who already have incumbents - so the serviceable market for small physio practices is wildly overstated.
Slide 1 & 6: No mention of GDPR, health-data processing, national e-health certification (e.g. German TI/KBV-style requirements), or medical record retention law - for software holding patient notes in three countries this is the single largest regulatory blind spot.
Slide 3: The mandatory digital records by 2027 tailwind is also a threat - it can trigger certification requirements and invite insurer-sponsored or association-sponsored free tools, a scenario never considered.

Non-Obvious Risk Factors

1Insurer-format dependency inverts the moat: the built-in NL, DE and PL claim formats are presented as a feature, but each format revision is an unscheduled engineering interrupt on a six-person team - a single German TI/claims standard change in 2027 could consume an entire quarter of the 45% product budget and stall the Series A milestone.

2The long tail is also a churn tail: practices of one to four therapists have high business mortality and ownership turnover, so even with a loved product, logo churn may run structurally high - at €89 ARPU with direct outbound CAC, a few points of monthly churn makes the €18m ARR curve arithmetically unreachable regardless of growth effort.

3Peer referral cuts both ways: Slide 10 celebrates that four practices came from another practice, but the same tight school-and-course network that spreads adoption will broadcast a data loss, billing error or insurer rejection across a national association within days - reputation is a single point of failure in a market this socially dense.

4The 2027 patient-payments line is a regulated business, not a feature: adding payment processing pulls Marlow into PSD2 / payment-institution territory or a dependency on a PSP partner, meaning the second revenue line that justifies the €18m ARR may require licensing, compliance hires, or margin share never modelled in the 80% gross margin assumption.

5Three-country footprint at seed fragments a six-hire team: NL, PL and DE mean three languages, three insurer regimes, three support time zones and three sales cultures on 18 months of runway - the risk is not failure in one market but sub-scale presence in all three, leaving no market deep enough to anchor a Series A story.

Black Swans

1A national health insurer or physiotherapy association in the Netherlands or Germany bundles a free or near-free compliant practice tool ahead of the 2027 digital-records mandate, instantly collapsing the €89/month price point in Marlow's two priority markets.

2A major EU practice-management incumbent (dental/GP) acquires a physio-specific vendor and cross-sells into the long tail with an existing insurer-certified claims stack - Marlow's only differentiator, insurer-ready formats, becomes table stakes while it is still at 11 practices.

3A health-data breach or GDPR enforcement action involving patient clinical notes at Marlow or a close comparable triggers mandatory certification across the category - a compliance burden a €1.2m seed with 18 months runway cannot absorb, ending the company regardless of product quality.

Reference Profile Comparison

How your deck compares to internal investor-readiness reference profiles

Problem Statement

82vs88-6

Solution & Value Proposition

80vs85-5

Market Opportunity

62vs82-20

Business Model

71vs80-9

Traction & Metrics

66vs90-24

Competitive Landscape

42vs78-36

Team & Founders

80vs92-12

Financial Projections

58vs75-17

Ask & Use of Funds

80vs82-2

Storytelling & Design

72vs88-16

Your score

High-signal profile reference profile

Competitive Landscape

Workflow Depth

Single functionScheduling + Clinical notes + Billing/ClaimsSolo & micro-practiceHospital/Enterprise

Marlow

EP?

Epic Systems

ZO?

Zocdoc

DO?

Doximity

ON?

One Medical

AM?

Amwell

Customer Size Focus

Your startup

From deck

AI-researched

AI-researched competitors are based on public knowledge - verify positioning independently

Competitive Landscape

42/100

There is no competition slide at all across the 14 slides; the only competitive hint is an oblique reference to "a desktop tool from 2009" on the Why Now slide.

Evidence

Slide 3: Acknowledges the status quo alternative - therapists "will not accept a desktop tool from 2009" - implying legacy incumbents exist
Slide 6: "Built for a practice of two, not a hospital" is a clear segment-level differentiation axis vs enterprise/hospital systems
Slide 6: Insurer and claim formats for the Netherlands, Germany and Poland "built in" is a latent regulatory/integration moat
Slide 4: Frames physiotherapy as "the largest unserved segment" vs dentists and GPs who "have had practice software for twenty years"

Issues

Slide 4 (or missing slide): No competitive landscape slide anywhere in the 14-slide deck - no named competitors in NL, DE or PL
Slide 2: The stated incumbent is "paper, a calendar app and a spreadsheet" - implies the deck treats non-consumption as the only competitor, close to a 'no competition' claim
Slide 8: €89/practice/month pricing is presented with no competitive price benchmark, so it is impossible to judge positioning
Slide 12: Roadmap (payments, exercise plans, locum marketplace) is not framed against what competitors already ship
Slide 11: Advisors include a former insurer claims director (NL), but no moat argument is built from that access

Suggestions

Add a dedicated competition slide naming the real incumbents by market (e.g. the NL/DE physio practice suites and generic tools like Google Calendar + Excel) with a 2-axis map: small-practice fit vs insurer-claim depth
Quantify the switching-cost and data moat: state how many insurer claim formats are certified and how long a new entrant would need to replicate NL+DE+PL coverage
Add a price/feature comparison row under Slide 8 showing €89/practice/month vs named alternatives' per-seat pricing
State win/loss evidence from the 11 live practices: what were they using before Marlow, and what did Marlow displace

The single largest gap in this deck is that across 14 slides, not one competitor is named. For a category as mature as practice-management software in the Netherlands, Germany and Poland, that reads as either naivety or avoidance - and investors will assume the latter. The load-bearing claim on Slide 4, that physiotherapists "mostly do not" have practice software, is asserted, never evidenced, and it is the premise the entire opportunity rests on. If even a third of Dutch physio practices already run incumbent scheduling-and-billing tools, the wedge narrows from greenfield to rip-and-replace, and the €89/month self-serve motion becomes a switching-cost fight rather than a digitisation story.

The differentiation that is articulated is genuinely good and under-sold: notes taken on a tablet during treatment, billing generated the moment the visit ends, insurer claim formats for NL, DE and PL built in, and setup in an afternoon with no implementation project. That last point is a real moat against enterprise EHRs, and the multi-country claim-format library is the most durable asset here - tedious, regulatory, compounding. But the deck never frames it as a moat; it buries it as a feature bullet.

Two further exposures: the roadmap collides with adjacent incumbents - patient payments puts Marlow against PSPs, exercise plans against prescription apps, a locum marketplace against staffing platforms - with no acknowledgement of any of them. And Slide 3's "mandatory digital records by 2027" is presented purely as tailwind, when the same mandate typically triggers national certification burdens and invites insurer- or association-sponsored free tooling that can price a €89 subscription out of existence. No GDPR or health-data position appears anywhere.

Sector Insights

Healthtech / Medtech

Sector Benchmark

As a Healthtech / Medtech startup, investors weigh "Team & Founders" more heavily - you scored 80/100

Sector Advice

Your Healthtech / Medtech-critical dimensions are solid - focus on overall polish

Narrative Review

The arc is clean, linear and unusually disciplined for a seed deck: a sharply observed problem, a credible why-now, a single-screen solution, early customers, a simple price, and a modest ask. It opens not with a grand vision but with a specific indignity - notes written after hours, invoices sent weeks late - and the two anchor numbers (6h/week of admin per therapist, a 23-day visit-to-invoice gap, drawn from 38 practice interviews) do real persuasive work because they are primary research, not a McKinsey slide. The quote from the Utrecht practice owner ("I used to spend Sunday evening on invoices") is the emotional peak of the deck and lands precisely because it is small and human rather than world-changing.

Where conviction stalls is the middle third. Slide 4 pivots from a tightly-scoped physio insight to a €4.2bn TAM covering all European healthcare practice management software - dentists and GPs included - which is exactly the segment the deck just argued Marlow is not serving. That is a narrative self-contradiction, and a sophisticated reader notices it immediately. Slide 7, labelled TRACTION, contains six practice names and zero numbers: no MRR, no trial-to-paid conversion, no churn, no usage depth, despite the product being live in 11 practices since March 2026. Calling six logos "trusted by leading practices" when they are two-to-four-therapist clinics strains the frame and makes the omission of metrics look deliberate rather than early.

The financial slide then asks for a leap of faith it never earns: €18m ARR by 2030 at €89/practice/month implies roughly 17,000 practices, a figure the deck never states or defends, and the 80% gross margin sits uneasily beside unmetered SMS, hands-on onboarding and three divergent insurer claim formats.

The close recovers. The ask - €1.2m SAFE, €300k already committed from two Dutch healthcare angels, 18 months runway, six named hires, Series A in 2028 once Germany is live - is specific, proportionate and milestone-linked. The closing line, "Every practice, out of the paper age," is memorable. Net: a credible, honest, under-quantified story that would convert far better with one real metrics slide and a defensible bottom-up market build.

Narrative Flow

iCoherence: 74/100

A tight problem-to-solution arc: quantified admin pain from 38 practice interviews, three timing tailwinds, a one-screen product, then model, financials, GTM, team and a disciplined €1.2m ask. The chain breaks where competition and evidence should sit - market size is asserted top-down and traction is a logo wall.

Marlow - Cover

cover

Smooth

Category and buyer are clear within two seconds; a traction line would strengthen it.

Problem

problem

Smooth

Workflow chain with 6h/week and 23-day anchors follows the cover naturally.

Why Now

other

Smooth

Three tailwinds build logically on the pain, though no regulation is named.

Market

market

Adequate

A single top-down €4.2bn TAM from an unnamed report weakens an otherwise strong setup.

Solution

solution

Smooth

Maps one-to-one onto the problem - book, treat, note, bill - with a tangible UI mockup.

Product

product

Smooth

'Built for a practice of two, not a hospital' sharpens the solution into a wedge.

Traction

traction

Abrupt

After concrete product proof, this drops to six names and no metrics - the arc loses momentum.

Business Model

business model

Adequate

Pricing is clear but arrives without CAC or churn to anchor it.

Financials

financials

Abrupt

The 40% YoY footnote contradicts the plotted curve, and no practice count bridges to €18m.

go-to-market

other

Adequate

Three credible channels, but it follows the forecast rather than preceding it and lacks funnel numbers.

Team

team

Smooth

Strong founder-market fit lands well, though placeholder portraits undercut it.

Roadmap

product

Adequate

Coherent 2026-2028 arc, but funded vs post-Series A items are unmarked.

The Ask

ask

Smooth

Specific €1.2m SAFE with €300k committed and a clear Series A trigger.

Closing / Contact

cover

Adequate

Memorable tagline but no explicit next step or recap metric.

Slide type

Cover

Problem

Other

Market

Solution

Product

Traction

Business Model

Financials

Team

Ask

Transition

Smooth

Adequate

Abrupt

Missing Narrative Beats

No competitive landscape anywhere before or after the market slideNo regulatory, GDPR or data-protection beat for software holding patient notes in three countriesNo unit economics (CAC, payback, churn) bridging business model to financialsNo bottom-up practice count linking €89 ARPU to the €18m ARR curveNo explicit call to action on the closing slide

Marlow is a well-grounded deck on the demand side - the problem is interview-validated across 38 practices, pricing is concrete, and the founding CEO is a practising physiotherapist - but the bias pattern clusters around unexamined upside.

The most damaging issues are Optimism Bias on Slide 9, where the plotted curve contradicts the stated 40% YoY assumption, Anchoring on a single €4.2bn unnamed-report TAM with no SAM/SOM, and Confirmation Bias expressed as the total absence of a competition slide in a category incumbents have served for twenty years.

Secondary Planning Fallacy and Expert Blind Spot signals show a team that models execution as technically solvable while under-specifying regulation, distribution economics (no CAC or LTV anywhere) and timeline risk.The fix is largely additive: bottom-up market math, a competitor map, unit economics, and a downside case.

Overall Awareness Score

71/100

Optimism Bias

high severity

Evidence:

The deck projects €18m ARR by 2030 from €0.1m in 2026 on only two stated assumptions, and the plotted curve (€0.9m → €3.4m → €9m → €18m) implies roughly 100%+ YoY growth, not the stated 40%. No churn, CAC or conversion driver supports the curve.

Impact on Investor Perception:

Investors who notice the internal contradiction between the stated 40% and the plotted curve will discount every other number in the deck, including the 400-practice milestone on the ask slide.

How to Counter:

Rebuild Slide 9 bottom-up: practices added per month × €89 ARPA × retention, reconcile the curve with the stated growth rate, and add a downside case at 50% of plan showing runway impact.

Appears in slides:

Planning Fallacy

medium severity

Evidence:

Six hires, a German localisation, insurer claim formats for three countries and 400 practices are all packed into 18 months with no stated buffer or dependency risk.

Impact on Investor Perception:

Experienced seed investors will see a roadmap-to-runway mismatch, suspecting a bridge round before the 2028 Series A.

How to Counter:

On Slide 13, show a month-by-month milestone plan with the minimum ARR needed for Series A, and flag which roadmap items (e.g. marketplace for locum therapists) are explicitly deferrable.

Appears in slides:

12, 13

The deck's strongest asset is a credible founder-market fit team with a live product in 11 practices, but nearly every commercial claim rests on assertion rather than data.The three most vulnerable assumptions are: (1) the total absence of a competitive slide paired with the unevidenced claim that physios 'mostly do not' have software - investors will name three incumbents in Q&A; (2) the €18m ARR by 2030 curve, which has no bridge from €89 ARPU to ~17,000 practices and an 80% gross margin that ignores SMS, hosting and three-country insurer-format maintenance as real COGS; and (3) a traction slide of six text logos with zero metrics despite being live for months.

The pattern is a deck that substitutes named practices and tailwind narrative for unit economics and customer-evidence.Closing these requires a named competitor matrix with win/loss data, a bottom-up model (practices × ARPU × churn) replacing the top-down TAM, cohort metrics - MRR, trial-to-paid, churn, usage depth per practice, an early CAC and payback figure from the outbound motion, and an explicit GDPR / health-data and record-retention compliance plan for NL, DE and PL.

Overall Gap Score

74/100

Evidence × Risk Matrix

7 assumptions plotted

Top-left (low evidence + high risk) is the danger zone - these claims need validation first.

critical high medium low

#	Claim	Evidence	Gap Score	Risk	Category
1	Slide 4 implies no meaningful competition - physiotherapists, chiropractors and osteopaths 'mostly do not' have practice software, framing physio as the largest unserved segment	None provided - there is no competitive landscape slide in 14 slides, no named incumbent EU physio or practice-management vendor, and the 'mostly do not' assertion carries no citation or survey data	92	critical	competitive
2	Slide 9 projects a path to €18m ARR by 2030 on 40% YoY growth and an 80% gross margin at scale	A line chart with no y-axis and two assumption lines; no bridge from €89/practice/month to practice count (€18m implies roughly 17,000 practices), and SMS, hosting and support COGS are never quantified against the 80% margin	88	critical	financials
3	Slide 7 claims practices are 'trusted by leading practices' with 6 partners across 3 countries, and Slide 5 states live in 11 practices since March 2026	Six practice names set as text, not logo artwork, plus one anonymous customer quote from Utrecht; zero metrics - no MRR, trial-to-paid conversion, churn, usage depth, or how many invoices actually flow through Marlow	84	critical	traction
4	Slide 4 sizes the opportunity at a €4.2bn TAM growing 11% a year for practice management software for healthcare practices in Europe	A single line citing an unnamed 'industry report, 2025'; the TAM explicitly spans dentists and GPs with existing incumbents, with no SAM or SOM narrowing to small physio practices	78	high	market
5	Slide 13 asks for €1.2m to reach 400 practices, with 35% to sales & marketing via outbound calls and 20-minute demos (Slide 10)	A funds-allocation bar chart and a note that four practices came by referral; no CAC, payback period, sales cycle length or close rate supports the 400-practice target	76	high	revenue
6	Slide 8 sets pricing at €89/practice/month for up to 4 therapists with SMS reminders included, no per-message fees, plus payment processing as a second revenue line in 2027	Pricing structure is stated clearly, but the 38 practice interviews (Slide 2) evidence pain, not willingness to pay - no data on current software spend or why €89 rather than €49 or €149	70	high	revenue
7	Slide 11 claims a complementary founding team: a physiotherapist CEO with eight years in a four-therapist Utrecht practice, a CTO who led a payments team at a Polish fintech and built v1 in six months, plus a consumer product designer	Specific, checkable operator backgrounds, a shipped live product in 11 practices, and named advisors - a former NL insurer claims director and an exited DE healthcare software founder; weakened only by placeholder portraits and no regulatory/GDPR owner named	30	medium	team

Investor Questions & Answer Prep

Investor Q&A prep with what each question is really testing.

You have no competitive slide in 14 slides - name the three incumbents you lose deals to today, and tell me your win rate against each.

What they're really testing

Whether you actually know the European physio practice-management landscape or built a product on an unverified assumption that the category is empty.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - named list of incumbent vendors by country (NL, PL, DE) with pricing and rough install base
Not in deck - win/loss log from the demos run to date, including reason-for-loss tags
Not in deck - what the 11 live practices switched from (paper, calendar app, spreadsheet, or a named competitor) - this is your strongest evidence
Slide 2 and Slide 4 claims ('mostly do not' have software) backed by a source better than assertion

How to answer

Acknowledge the missing competitive slide as a deck gap, not a knowledge gap, then immediately name specific vendors per market and state what each is weak at.Pivot to your real differentiator - that your displacement is mostly from paper and spreadsheets, evidenced by switch-from data across your live practices.

Close by committing to a named competitive matrix in the data room.

Never say this

x'There's really no one doing this for physiotherapists - the category is empty.'
x'We haven't lost any deals yet' said without disclosing how few competitive deals have even occurred.

Your €18m ARR by 2030 at €89/month implies roughly 17,000 paying practices - walk me through the practice-count build, because 40% YoY growth is an output, not a plan.

What they're really testing

Whether your model is built bottom-up from sales capacity or reverse-engineered from a venture-scale headline number.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - bottom-up build: practices per rep per month × reps hired per year × ramp time × churn
Not in deck - total licensed practices per target country from public registries (your GTM on Slide 10 already cites these)
Not in deck - blended ARPU assumption including the €19/extra-therapist expansion and annual-plan discount
Slide 9 curve and Slide 13 hiring plan (three engineering, two sales, one support) reconciled against each other

How to answer

Concede that Slide 9 shows an output curve and that the real plan is a capacity model, then walk the chain from reps × productivity × ramp × churn to practice count.Sense-check that count against total addressable practices per registry so the implied penetration is visibly defensible.

Offer the model spreadsheet rather than defending the headline.

Never say this

x'40% growth is conservative for SaaS at this stage.'
xDiscovering the 17,000-practice implication live in the room and improvising the arithmetic.

You are live in 11 practices but show zero metrics - what is your MRR, your trial-to-paid conversion, and how many of the 11 are actually paying versus free or founder-network favours?

What they're really testing

Whether 'live in 11 practices' is commercial traction or friendly pilots dressed as revenue.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - current MRR and the paying/free/discounted split across the 11 practices
Not in deck - trial-to-paid conversion off the 30-day trial on Slide 8, with trial starts as denominator
Not in deck - usage depth: notes written per therapist per week, invoices generated in-product, logins
Not in deck - churn/retention since March 2026 and any practice that stopped using it

How to answer

Lead with the exact paying-versus-free split before being pushed to it - volunteering the weaker number buys credibility.Then redirect to the metric that is genuinely strong at this stage, which is usage depth and retention, not revenue scale.

Frame Slide 7 as a logo slide that should have been a metrics slide and commit to replacing it.

Never say this

x'It's too early for metrics at 11 practices.'
xCounting free pilots or founder-network practices as customers without disclosing it unprompted.

Of the 6 logos on Slide 7, how many are paying full price, and how many came through the CEO's own Utrecht network or founder relationships?

What they're really testing

Whether your early demand is repeatable outside the founder's personal network - the core risk in founder-market-fit stories.

Data to have ready

Slide 7 - per-logo acquisition source (founder network, outbound cold, referral) and price paid
Slide 10 claim that four practices came via referral - reconcile this with the logo list
Not in deck - count of fully cold-sourced wins and the cold-outbound demo-to-close rate
Not in deck - permission/reference status for each named practice

How to answer

Answer the attribution question plainly and without hedging, since a network-heavy start is normal and even a strength given Anna's background on Slide 11.Then shift the burden of proof to the cold-sourced cohort, however small, as the real signal of repeatability.

State explicitly what cold conversion evidence the seed money is meant to buy.

Never say this

xVague framing like 'a mix of inbound and network' without naming the split.
x'Our network is our moat' - treating non-repeatable access as defensibility.

You allocate 35% of €1.2m to sales for an outbound motion with no stated CAC - at €89/month, what CAC and payback period does a 20-minute-demo-to-close model actually produce?

What they're really testing

Whether a low-ACV SMB product can survive a human-touch outbound motion, or whether unit economics break at scale.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - current fully-loaded CAC including founder selling time, and CAC payback in months
Not in deck - funnel math: calls → demos booked → demos → closes from the Slide 10 motion
Not in deck - LTV using observed or assumed churn and the €19/therapist expansion uplift
Not in deck - rep quota and ramp assumptions underpinning the two sales hires on Slide 13

How to answer

Acknowledge that ACV at this price point forces payback discipline, then show your current funnel conversion rates and resulting payback even if the sample is small. Explain how the mix shifts over time toward lower-cost channels - referrals and association partnerships on Slide 10 - and what CAC ceiling would cause you to stop scaling outbound.

Never say this

x'We'll figure out CAC after we hire the sales team.'
xQuoting a CAC that excludes founder time, salaries or tooling as if it were fully loaded.

You hold patient clinical notes across NL, PL and DE and the deck never says GDPR, data residency, or national e-health certification - what is your current compliance posture, and who signed off on it?

What they're really testing

Whether health-data regulatory exposure is a managed workstream or an unexamined liability that could block German entry entirely.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - GDPR Art. 9 processing basis, DPAs with practices, data residency/hosting region, sub-processor list
Not in deck - German e-health certification requirements and timeline, with cost and engineering estimate
Not in deck - record retention periods per country and breach/liability insurance status
Slide 11 - what your former NL insurer claims director advisor has reviewed and signed off

How to answer

Treat this as a competence question, not a checklist question: state your current posture crisply, name who reviewed it, then be honest about what is not yet in place.Convert the gap into a funded workstream with a named owner and a milestone tied to the German launch on Slide 12.

Reframe certification burden as a barrier to entry that favours a prepared entrant.

Never say this

x'We're GDPR compliant' with no named counsel, DPA, or hosting detail behind it.
x'We'll handle certification when we get to Germany' - the market you've already priced into the plan.

Your 23-day invoice gap and 6h/week come from 38 interviews you ran yourself - how do you control for the fact that the CEO is a physiotherapist interviewing her own professional network?

What they're really testing

Whether your foundational problem evidence is independently verifiable or a sophisticated form of confirmation bias.

Data to have ready

Slide 2 - interview methodology: recruitment source, how many were strangers versus known contacts, question script
Not in deck - product-measured confirmation: actual visit-to-invoice gap observed in the 11 live practices before and after
Not in deck - any third-party or association data corroborating admin burden in physiotherapy
Not in deck - variance/distribution behind the averages, not just the headline figures

How to answer

Accept the selection-bias critique as legitimate rather than defending the interviews, then show that the same numbers are now reproduced by in-product telemetry from live practices - observed data beats self-reported data.Note any independent corroboration and be explicit about which figure you hold most and least confidence in.

Position Anna's insider access as speed of access, validated externally.

Never say this

x'I'm a physiotherapist - I know this industry, the data is right.'
xPresenting self-reported averages as hard metrics with no distribution or product-side confirmation.

SMS reminders with no per-message fees and three countries of insurer claim formats both sit inside an 80% gross margin assumption - show me the actual COGS per practice today.

What they're really testing

Whether you understand that unmetered SMS, hosting, support and multi-format claim maintenance are structural margin leaks in a low-ACV product.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - actual COGS per practice per month today: SMS spend, hosting, support hours, payment fees
Not in deck - SMS volume per practice per month and worst-case cost at heavy usage versus the €89 price
Not in deck - engineering hours per quarter maintaining NL, PL and DE claim formats, and whether you treat that as COGS or R&D
Slide 9 - current gross margin versus the 80%-at-scale assumption, with the bridge between them

How to answer

Separate true COGS from the claim-format engineering tax and be explicit about where you classify each, since that classification is what the investor is actually testing.Give today's real per-practice cost, then show the levers that move it toward the Slide 9 assumption - SMS bundling caps, self-serve onboarding, support deflection.

Name the fair-use trigger that protects you from an outlier high-SMS practice.

Never say this

x'80% is standard for SaaS.'
xClaiming SMS costs are negligible without a per-practice volume figure to back it.

If digital records become mandatory by 2027, what stops a national physiotherapy association or an insurer from funding a free compliant tool and eliminating your category overnight?

What they're really testing

Whether your 'why now' tailwind on Slide 3 is actually a double-edged regulatory risk that could commoditise the compliance layer you're selling.

Data to have ready

Not in deck - precedent evidence: what happened in dentistry/GP when mandates landed in NL, PL, DE - did free tools win?
Not in deck - your association partnership strategy (Slide 10) reframed as co-option rather than exposure
Not in deck - the non-compliance value you deliver: scheduling, online booking, tablet notes, cash-flow speed, not just claim formats
Slide 11 - what your ex-insurer claims director advisor says about insurer appetite to build and support software

How to answer

Concede that compliance alone is not a moat and that mandates can commoditise the claim layer, then separate your value into the compliance layer versus the daily workflow layer where free tools historically underinvest.Cite precedent from adjacent professions and explain why associations partner rather than build.

Present your association strategy from Slide 10 as actively de-risking this scenario.

Never say this

x'Associations and insurers aren't software companies, they'd never build it.'
xTreating the 2027 mandate purely as a tailwind with no downside case articulated.

Your roadmap adds patient payments, exercise plans and a locum marketplace by 2028 on six hires - which of these do you kill if Germany localisation takes twice as long as planned?

What they're really testing

Whether you have focus and prioritisation discipline, or a roadmap written to impress rather than to be executed.

Data to have ready

Slide 12 - engineering effort estimate per roadmap item against the three engineering hires on Slide 13
Not in deck - German localisation critical path: claim formats, certification, language, with a slip-risk assessment
Not in deck - customer-demand evidence ranking the three roadmap items (requests from the 11 live practices)
Not in deck - your revenue-per-engineering-hour ranking: which item protects retention versus which is optional

How to answer

Answer the question directly by naming what you cut first and second - hesitation here reads as lack of conviction.Justify the ordering by retention impact and customer-requested demand, not by market size, and note that the locum marketplace and exercise plans compete with established players per the competitive gap.

Close by showing Germany is the gating milestone for Series A on Slide 13, so it wins any resource conflict by design.

Never say this

x'We'd find a way to do all of it - the team is efficient.'
xDefending the locum marketplace as a core bet when no customer has asked for it.

Deck vs. Diagnostic

healthtechseedConfidence: 78%

It is vertical B2B software for healthcare providers, handling clinical notes and insurer claims, which places it in healthtech/medtech despite being a pure SaaS model.

Slide Impact Matrix

Priority Fix

Star Slides

Low Priority

Over-invested

Investor Importance

Execution Quality →

Investor Objection Heatmap

Where investors will push back hardest. Longer bars mean more objections in that area.

#AreaVolumeCountSlides

1Unit Econ

Unit Econ

slides: 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13

2Market

Market

slides: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12

3Traction

Traction

slides: 5, 7, 9, 10, 13

4Other

Other

slides: 1, 2, 11, 14

5Product

Product

slides: 5, 6, 8, 12

6Timing

Timing

slides: 3, 12, 13

7Competition

Competition

slides: 5, 6

8Team

Team

slides: 10, 11

Low

Medium

High

Slide Heatmap

172

Marlow - Cover

278

Problem

376

Why Now

458

Market

580

Solution

668

Product - Built for a practice…

742

Traction - Trusted by leading …

874

Business Model - Simple subscr…

955

Financials - Path to EUR 18m A…

1070

go-to-market - We sell directl…

1168

Team

1264

Roadmap

1372

The Ask

1458

Closing / Contact

Low

High

Slide-by-Slide Analysis

i14 slides

#1Marlow - Cover

cover

The Marlow wordmark is present and the descriptor "Practice software for physiotherapists. Scheduling, notes and billing in one place" is admirably concrete - an investor knows the category and buyer within two seconds. What is missing is any signal of momentum or geography: the cover states the ask (Seed, €1.2m, Spring 2026) but gives no traction hook or founder contact, so the first impression is category-clear but credibility-neutral.

#2Problem

problem

The problem is told through a credible workflow chain - handwritten notes, double bookings, late invoices, re-typed insurer paperwork - and the two quantified anchors (6h/week admin per therapist; 23 days average visit-to-invoice gap) are exactly what investors want.

The strongest asset is primary evidence from 38 practice interviews in 2025, which beats a cited analyst stat.The weakness is that pain is described in hours, never in euros, so the buyer's willingness to pay is left unproven.

#3Why Now

timing

Three tailwinds - digital records mandates by 2027, generational expectation of consumer-grade tools, and slow consolidation leaving a long tail independent - form a coherent and non-generic timing argument.The regulatory driver is the sharpest point but is asserted without a named directive, country or deadline source, which makes the strongest claim the least verifiable.

The consolidation point also cuts both ways: a fragmented long tail is hard and expensive to sell into.

#4Market

market

The €4.2bn figure is TAM for all European healthcare practice management software, which is far broader than physiotherapy and therefore overstates the reachable opportunity; the 11% growth rate helps but the "industry report, 2025" citation is unnamed.

The genuinely persuasive argument is qualitative - physiotherapists, chiropractors and osteopaths outnumber dentists in every market examined yet lack the software dentists have had for twenty years - and that insight deserves to carry the slide.

Without SAM/SOM an investor cannot size your realistic ceiling.

#5Solution

solution

This slide maps one-to-one onto the problem slide - book, treat, note, bill - and the UI mockup with colour-coded status chips makes the "billing generated from the notes" claim tangible rather than aspirational.The buried proof point is "live in 11 practices since March 2026", which is real deployed traction hiding at the bottom of a solution slide instead of headlining a traction slide.

The open question is defensibility: scheduling plus notes plus invoicing is a well-populated category, and insurer format coverage is asserted without specifying which insurers.

#6Product - Built for a practice of two, not a hospital

product

The positioning line "Built for a practice of two, not a hospital" is a sharp wedge, and the three pillars (afternoon setup, tablet-native notes, NL/DE/PL invoice and claim formats built in) map directly to small-practice pain. The Utrecht practice owner quote about Sunday evenings is the strongest line on the slide, but there is no product visual or screenshot, so investors have to take the usability claim on faith.

#7Traction - Trusted by leading practices

traction

Six named practices across three countries shows early international pull, but this is a logo wall with no numbers - no ARR, no paying versus pilot split, no retention, no usage. At seed, the traction slide carries the most weight of any slide, and the absence of revenue and retention data makes 6 partners read as unvalidated pilots.

#8Business Model - Simple subscription per practice

business model

Pricing is clear and credible: EUR 89/practice/month for up to 4 therapists, EUR 19 per extra therapist, 30-day trial, annual plans with two months free, plus a 2027 payments line. What is missing is the economics underneath - no CAC, payback, or LTV, and EUR 89 ARPU means a direct-sales motion must be extremely cheap to work.

#9Financials - Path to EUR 18m ARR

financials

The curve is legible - EUR 0.1m (2026) to EUR 18m (2030) with break-even in Year 3 - but the stated 40% YoY growth from 2027 contradicts the plotted jumps (0.9 to 3.4 to 9 to 18 is roughly 100-280% per year), which an investor will catch immediately. There is also no cost line, headcount, or burn, so the forecast cannot be tied back to the EUR 89 price point or any customer count.

#10go-to-market - We sell directly to practice owners

Three concrete channels with a real proof point - "Four of our practices came from another practice" - plus a sensible sequencing (NL and PL first on founder networks, Germany 2027) using public licence registries as a lead source. The weakness is that none of the channels carry numbers: no demo-to-close rate, no cost per practice acquired, and association partnerships are described as intent rather than signed.

#11Team

team

The founder-market fit story is genuinely strong: Anna K.(CEO) is a physiotherapist with eight years in a four-therapist practice in Utrecht who ran the admin herself, Tomasz W.(CTO) led a payments team at a Polish fintech and built the first Marlow version in six months, and Jonas M.

(Product) is a product designer formerly at a consumer scheduling app with two million users, and owns onboarding and the tablet experience.The abstract teal placeholder circles instead of real photos and the initials-only surnames make the team read as anonymous, which undercuts credibility at exactly the moment an investor is deciding whether to trust these people.

The advisor line (former insurer claims director NL, healthcare software founder DE, exited 2022) is relevant to the insurer-claims and Germany roadmap but is buried in one line.

#12Roadmap

product

The 2026-2028 arc is coherent and ties directly to the positioning line "from notes and billing to the practice's operating system," with sensible sequencing from NL/PL claim formats to German localisation to multi-location and a locum marketplace.

What is missing is any link between roadmap items and outcomes - no feature is tied to a revenue, retention, or practice-count milestone, so an investor cannot tell which items are funded by this round versus aspiration.The 2028 column (marketplace, outcome tracking) also reads as scope creep away from the core billing wedge.

#13The Ask

ask

This is a clean, specific ask: €1.2m SAFE with €300k committed from two Dutch healthcare angels, 18 months of runway, six named hires, and a clear Series A trigger of Germany being live in 2028.The allocation split (45% product and engineering, 35% sales and marketing, 20% operations) is reasonable but generic.

The weakness is that "reach 400 practices" is stated without the underlying unit economics - no CAC, ACV, or payback - so an investor cannot judge whether €1.2m realistically buys 400 practices or whether 400 practices is a fundable Series A story.

#14Closing / Contact

cover

The Marlow wordmark and the tagline "Every practice, out of the paper age" are present and the closing line is memorable, with Anna's email and Utrecht location given.However the slide ends passively - there is no explicit next step, no recap of the headline proof point, and no phone or calendar link.

A closing slide is the last thing an investor screenshots, so it should carry the one number you want remembered.

Next Steps

Turn the report into a focused rebuild plan

Focus first on Competitive Landscape (42/100).

1
Execute the action plan
Follow the recommended sequence in order, beginning with the highest-impact changes.
2
Prepare investor objections
Use the Q&A, objection heatmap, and slide notes to rehearse strong answers.
3
Tighten the narrative arc
Make sure each slide builds conviction toward the ask.
4
Re-submit for a readiness check
Your deck needs to reach the 80+ VC-ready range. Re-submit after implementing the fixes.
5
Start targeted outreach
Lead with the strongest proof points and fix the weakest evidence gaps before broad outreach.

Metric Glossary

Plain-English definitions of the main report metrics.

Overall Score

A 0-100 investor-readiness score combining deck content, narrative clarity, visual quality, and fundraising risk signals.

BSA Score

Business Situational Awareness: how clearly the company understands the business, customer, and market environment behind the pitch.

KYB / KYC / KYE

Know Your Business, Know Your Customer, and Know Your Environment. These diagnose business model clarity, customer insight, and market context.

Deck-grounded %

The share of report claims directly supported by content found in the deck. Lower values mean more inference or outside context.

Investor Readiness

A practical readiness label for the next fundraising conversation, based on blockers, evidence gaps, and stage fit.

Priority Fixes

The highest-leverage changes to make before the next investor conversation, ordered by likely impact.

Investor Objection Heatmap

A ranked view of where investors are most likely to push back: product, market, traction, competition, timing, team, or unit economics.

Slide Impact Matrix

A map of slide execution quality versus investor importance. Low-quality, high-importance slides are the urgent fixes.

Narrative Flow

How smoothly the deck moves from problem to solution, market, traction, business model, team, and ask.

Competitive Positioning Map

A simplified 2D view of how the startup is positioned against named competitors. AI-researched competitors should be verified.

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Marlow

Score Overview

Marlow

Top Priority

Critical Red Flags

Action Plan

Add competitive landscape slide

Replace top-down TAM with bottom-up

Rebuild traction slide around metrics

Insert regulatory and data-protection slide

Add unit economics and margin build

Top Strengths

Priority Fixes

Investor Readiness

Blockers

Improvements for Next Level

Fundraising Readiness Roadmap

What Would Change an Investor's Mind

Radar Analysis

CONTENT / NARRATIVE - SCORE 71 (Grade B)

VISUAL ANALYSIS - SCORE 81 (Grade A-)

Content & Narrative

Problem Statement

Solution & Value Proposition

Market Opportunity

Business Model

Traction & Metrics

Competitive Landscape

Team & Founders

Financial Projections

Ask & Use of Funds

Storytelling & Design

Regulatory & Compliance

IP & Technical Defensibility

Visual & Design

Visual Hierarchy

Readability

Layout

Consistency

Data Visualization

Credibility Signals

Narrative Flow

Missing Content

Know Your Business

Know Your Customer

Know Your Environment

Non-Obvious Risk Factors

Black Swans

Reference Profile Comparison

Competitive Landscape

Competitive Landscape

Sector Insights

Narrative Review

Narrative Flow

Optimism Bias

Planning Fallacy

Evidence × Risk Matrix

Investor Questions & Answer Prep

You have no competitive slide in 14 slides - name the three incumbents you lose deals to today, and tell me your win rate against each.

Your €18m ARR by 2030 at €89/month implies roughly 17,000 paying practices - walk me through the practice-count build, because 40% YoY growth is an output, not a plan.

You are live in 11 practices but show zero metrics - what is your MRR, your trial-to-paid conversion, and how many of the 11 are actually paying versus free or founder-network favours?

Of the 6 logos on Slide 7, how many are paying full price, and how many came through the CEO's own Utrecht network or founder relationships?

You allocate 35% of €1.2m to sales for an outbound motion with no stated CAC - at €89/month, what CAC and payback period does a 20-minute-demo-to-close model actually produce?

You hold patient clinical notes across NL, PL and DE and the deck never says GDPR, data residency, or national e-health certification - what is your current compliance posture, and who signed off on it?

Your 23-day invoice gap and 6h/week come from 38 interviews you ran yourself - how do you control for the fact that the CEO is a physiotherapist interviewing her own professional network?

SMS reminders with no per-message fees and three countries of insurer claim formats both sit inside an 80% gross margin assumption - show me the actual COGS per practice today.

If digital records become mandatory by 2027, what stops a national physiotherapy association or an insurer from funding a free compliant tool and eliminating your category overnight?

Your roadmap adds patient payments, exercise plans and a locum marketplace by 2028 on six hires - which of these do you kill if Germany localisation takes twice as long as planned?

Deck vs. Diagnostic

Slide Impact Matrix

Investor Objection Heatmap

Slide Heatmap

Slide-by-Slide Analysis

#1Marlow - Cover

#2Problem

#3Why Now

#4Market

#5Solution

#6Product - Built for a practice of two, not a hospital

#7Traction - Trusted by leading practices